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European Central Bank working paper series 20  Abstract 
 
This paper discusses various theoretic concepts which play a role in assessing the public benefits 
of Target, the large value RTGS payment network operated by the Eurosystem. These concepts 
touch upon natural monopoly, network externalities, competition and contestability, as well as 
economies of scale and scope. The existence of a natural monopoly provides a rationale for a 
temporary partial or full subsidy in order for Target to achieve the ‘most efficient scale’ or apply 
the most efficient technology to lower unit costs. Such a subsidy could be implemented through 
temporary 'penetration' pricing. Based on empirical results for the Federal Reserve’s payment 
system (Fedwire), it is further argued that if Target decided to standardize its operating platforms 
and consolidate its processing sites into one or a few centers, it too could realize strong scale 
economy benefits and lower unit costs. 
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In a rapidly changing payment landscape, a lively policy debate was recently triggered 
about the cost effectiveness and the quantification of a possible ‘public good factor’ of 
the large-value payment system Target. This paper discusses the various public good 
issues related to the benefits that accrue to an interconnected Target payment network, 
the implications for market competition in large value payment services, how unit costs 
may change as payment volume expands on a network with standardized hardware and 
software, and the potential usefulness of knowing for pricing purposes how costs are 
associated with the different services provided by Target.  
 
Broadly, the analysis is carried out along two parallel lines. First, economic theory is 
used to identify relevant concepts that play a role in assessing the public good character 
of large-value payment systems. Theoretically, we take the position that achieving a 
‘most efficient scale’ could justify a full or partial subsidy on Target for a limited time 
period, until the point at which potential scale economies are fully realized given the size 
of the market. Second, learning from the Fedwire consolidation and standardization 
experience in the eighties and nineties, in the empirical part it is argued that if Target 
decided to consolidate its processing sites into one or few centers, complemented by the 
implementation of new standardized processing technologies, it could realize strong 
scale benefits and markedly lower unit costs. Temporary ‘penetration’ pricing in the form 
of subsidizing Target payments could achieve these benefits more rapidly and result, 
once the lower unit costs are realized, in full cost pricing to users while saving resources 
now expended by central banks but are unrecovered in current pricing arrangements. 
 
The argument for a subsidy is based on the fact that if full cost pricing were implemented 
on the current Target system, scale economy benefits either would not be realized (as a 
portion of current users would find alternative payment arrangements/networks) or would 
not be realized as rapidly (extending the period where currently high unit costs are 
incurred). Once lower unit costs are achieved on Target, the subsidy would be removed 
and full cost pricing implemented so that users would face the full costs of their payment 
decisions. This matches user benefits with user costs, a result which more properly 
allocates resources in a society.     
 
Possible scope economies on Target between central bank monetary operations 
responsibilities and providing payment services for the private sector could not be 
determined due to a lack of the necessary cost accounting data for these two broad 
categories of Target services. Information that does exist, however, suggests that scope 
benefits may be small, as they have been found to be in empirical studies of scope 
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I. Introduction  
 
This paper discusses the various public good issues related to the benefits that accrue 
to an interconnected payment network like Target, the large-value RTGS payment 
network for the Eurozone. We also discuss the implications for market competition in 
large value payment services, how unit costs may change as payment volume expands 
on a network with standardized hardware and software, and the potential usefulness of 
knowing for pricing purposes how costs are associated with the different services 
provided by Target.  
 
We take the position that achieving a ‘most efficient scale’ could justify a full or partial 
subsidy on Target for a limited time period, until the point at which potential scale 
economies are fully realized given the size of the market. Based on the consolidation 
experience of Fedwire in the U.S., if Target decided to consolidate its processing sites 
into one or a few centers, complemented by the implementation of new standardized 
processing technologies, it would likely realize strong scale benefits and markedly lower 
unit costs.  Temporary ‘penetration’ pricing in the form of subsidizing Target payments 
could achieve these benefits more rapidly and result, once the lower unit costs are 
realized, in full cost pricing to users while saving resources now expended by central 
banks but are unrecovered in current pricing arrangements. 
 
In what follows, section II discusses concepts that touch upon natural monopoly, network 
externalities, competition and contestability, as well as two-sided markets since these 
considerations determine the public good aspects of Target. Possible lessons from the 
telecommunications industry are also outlined. Section III notes the existing empirical 
evidence suggesting that large value payment operations, when properly structured, 
contain elements of a natural monopoly and can experience strong scale benefits. 
Although data are lacking, section IV outlines ways in which costs may be allocated and 
prices derived for a network such as Target which provides both monetary control 
services for central banks as well as funds transfers for the private banking sector. 
Section V concludes. 
 
 
II. Payment system efficiency, natural monopoly, network effects, and competition 
 
2.1  Efficiency, natural monopoly, scale and scope   
 
Efficiency in payment systems is not easy to define. While prices and the social and 
private costs of making payments are important, other aspects such as speed, 
convenience, safety, and reliability are contributing factors to the efficiency of payment 
systems.  There are basically three dimensions of economic efficiency: allocative 
efficiency (the extent to which total welfare of consumers and suppliers is being 
maximized); productive efficiency (the degree to which costs of production are being 
minimized); and dynamic efficiency (the extent to which suppliers are able to meet the 
changing needs and preferences of consumers over time in the most efficient way).   
Whereas allocative and productive efficiency are static and focus on how to split up 
existing costs, dynamic efficiency refers to how costs may change in the future. These 
efficiency concepts are useful when assessing the public good factor of Target. 
 
Payment systems are characterized by strong economies of scale and are often said to 
be natural monopolies.  A natural monopoly exists if, over the relevant range of demand, 
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the cost function is subadditive.  This means that it costs less to produce two or more 
outputs together than to produce each one separately 
3.  Cost subadditivity is important 
because it sheds light on the most efficient scale of an industry and can provide a 
rationale for a temporary partial or full subsidy on Target. We suggest that as long as the 
most efficient scale has not yet been reached, a ‘penetration’ pricing policy in the form of 
a subsidy (i.e., setting prices lower than marginal costs) might be employed to boost 
demand for Target payments and achieve a higher, more efficient scale. After scale 
benefits are realized, the subsidy would be removed and prices would reflect the full cost 
of production (and thereby align better user benefits with user costs, resulting in an 
efficient allocation of resources). 
 
In addition, scope economies may also exist among the various payments services 
supplied on a large-value payment network. In particular, Target currently provides both 
government-related services and payment services to private banks of financial 
institutions. It is likely that the joint costs of providing government-related and banking 
industry services on Target are lower than the ‘stand-alone’ costs of providing these 
services separately. Interestingly, as is shown in Tirole (1989), the concept of cost 
subadditivity for multiproduct firms also allows a meaningful definition of economics of 
scope in terms of these stand-alone costs. 
 
2.2 Network effects, competition, and two-sided markets 
 
Payment systems exhibit strong network externalities. These externatilities arise when a 
good or service is more valuable to a user the more users that adopt the same good or 
service. On the demand side, the size of a network is a key factor for its total value to 
users. However, in attracting more and more users an existing network may increase its 
advantage over competing networks, ultimately pushing smaller networks out of the 
market (called ‘tipping’). Here end-users would be effectively locked-in by the single 
existing network.  
 
On the supply side, compatibility, interoperability and standardization are necessary 
ingredients for expanding the size of a network (McAndrews, 1997). In payment 
systems, compatibility can be achieved by adherence to technical standards, 
infrastructural arrangements and interbank cooperation.  Standardization and 
compatibility make sure that economies of scale are fully exhausted. There are, 
however, potential dangers. For example, in the early stages of setting up a network 
firms might have been coordinating on what turns out later to be a less efficient 
technology.  Having attained a large installed base, it would be difficult and expensive to 
then upgrade to newer technology. As well, a dominant network provider may have an 
incentive to supply incompatible services in order to improve its market position. In these 
instances, allocative and dynamic efficiency would be reduced. Overall, network 
externalities and economies of scale may induce a monopolistic market structure since 
duplication of fixed costs is often not socially desirable. 
 
The potential negative effects from a monopolistic market structure for large value 
payments can be mitigated if markets are contestable.  A necessary condition for 
contestability to occur is the removal of significant barriers to entry to and exit from the 
market. In the current context of competition between Target and the private large value 
payment network Euro1, allowing a price subsidy for Target makes the market less 
                                                 
3 See Tirole (1989) for a thorough discussion about economies of scale and cost subadditivity. 
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contestable and might increase economic barriers for Euro1 or others to enter in the 
same market. 
 
Electronic payment systems typically have large set-up costs because of their relative 
capital intensity, making actual network competition hardly a viable option. Thus the 
ability for a potential entrant to access the existing network becomes an important issue. 
This type of competition--often dubbed 'platform' competition--triggers the complex issue 
of access pricing. An incumbent network may levy fees on new entrants for accessing its 
network. If these fees are too high (e.g., a fee higher than its own end-user price), then 
competition cannot be of any benefit to end-users as their costs would be higher with the 
new entrant. At the same time, access fees cannot be set too low, in order to prevent 
inefficient competitors to enter the market causing productive inefficiencies. The practice 
of setting high access fees is a form of 'raising rival costs' and may arise in the context of 
Target and Euro1 as Euro1 now accesses the Target network for final settlement. 
 
The market for large-value payments is in effect a two-sided market where payees and 
payors (initiators and receivers) 'consume' the good (the payment). For a payment to be 
executed in Target, both sides need to be connected to Target. In these markets, 
‘platforms’ coordinate the demands of these two distinct segments accounting for the 
interactions between them on the demand side when devising pricing and investment 
policies. A key aspect involves the optimal price structure which involves the division of 
fees between the two sides of the market to get them both on board. Optimal prices for 
the different segments of end-users must balance the demand among these segments--
and the need for an optimal pricing structure as well as an optimal pricing level 
distinguishes a one-sided from a two-sided market. As Evans (2003) points out, in two-
sided markets the demand for the product may completely vanish if the pricing structure 
is incorrect.       
 
More precisely, Rochet and Tirole (2004) define a two-sided market as a market in which 
the total volume of transactions varies with the price for one side of the market while 
keeping the total price constant. They show that the distribution of the total fee over the 
two segments depends on the demand elasticities of the product.
4 Although in their 
framework the optimal total fee obeys the well-known inverse-elasticity rule for 
monopolistic price setting, it may indeed be the case that the optimal price for one side 
of the market will be set below its marginal cost. These two-sided pricing principles may 
also be important for large-value payment markets. In setting the prices for a large value 
payment, Target needs to get both segments on board. Currently, only one side of the 
market (initiators of payments) is charged for executing payments on Target. Although, 
on average, this pricing scheme will not result in major cost differentials between the two 
types of Target users (as each user is likely to be initiator and receiver about half of the 
time), it can affect the total realized volume within Target.    
   
2.3 Lessons from the telecommunications industry  
 
Payment systems require telecommunication networks. Therefore, the study of 
telecommunication networks can provide useful insights about the functioning and 
design of payment system networks. Mason and Valletti (2001) describe several main 
                                                 
4 Surprisingly, at an interior solution, the most elastic side is charged the highest fee in the 
monopoly situation, see Rochet and Tirole (2003). Bolt and Tieman (2003) show that the reverse 
may be true for corner solutions.  
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defining characteristics of communication networks that may also apply to payment 
systems. The first characteristic is the specific cost structure of networks, where one 
typically incurs large fixed cost attached to setting up the network but faces a low 
marginal cost of operating the network. Strong complementarity between the different 
network components is the second factor, so that there are large gains to connecting two 
networks, but can also create a bottleneck problem. The third factor is demand 
externalities which, in short, states that networks are more valuable if there are more 
people using them. The fourth characteristic refers to social obligations, in the sense that 
these networks are often viewed as providing essential services. On top of these, we 
may add that both industries are two-sided where we distinguish payees and payors in 
payment systems, and senders and receivers in telecommunication networks. The 
combination of all these characteristics pose a real challenge to the analysis of pricing, 
social benefits and regulation of these networks.        
     
The experience of the telecommunication firm AT&T in the US offers some parallels to 
determining the public good benefits/costs associated with Target. AT&T previously 
operated as a legal monopoly in providing both local and long-distance phone service. 
This allowed it to achieve lower unit costs due to the existence of marked scale 
economies in the provision of both local and long-distance phone service.  AT&T was 
treated as if it were a natural monopoly since the public benefits of having a single 
producer results in the lowest cost of production.  To ensure that these low costs are 
passed on to consumers, prices were regulated to cover all cost plus a normal return on 
invested capital. 
 
At the time, AT&T was charging prices lower than costs for local service but higher than 
costs on long-distance.  When combined, all costs were covered but the pricing structure 
led to challenges by potential new entrants who wished to enter the long distance market 
but could only do so if AT&T was no longer deemed a natural monopoly.  It was 
determined that the cost of the joint provision of local and long distance phone services 
by AT&T alone was not notably lower than if these two services would be provided 
separately by different firms.  As scope economies did not apparently importantly exist 
between local and long distance, even though both services experience very large scale 
economies, AT&T was broken up and new firms entered the long distance market. The 
relevance of the AT&T experience and other telecom businesses to Target is that Target 
produces two services--government payment services as well transaction services used 
by banks.  The same scope economy issue faced in the telecommunication industry also 
applies to Target.  
 
 
III. Scale economies on large-value payment networks 
 
3.1. Estimates of scale effects   
 
Scale economies exist on payment networks as unit cost per transaction typically falls as 
volume is increased.  This is seen in a recent analysis showing how unit cost falls as 
transaction volume expands across 11 Target processing sites in 2000 (European 
Central Bank, 2001, page 9). The figure shown there reflects strong scale effects when 
processed volume varies between 1 to 5 million transactions annually but unit costs 
appear to be flat for volumes greater than 5 million.  While 22 million transactions were 
processed at the largest site on Target in 2000, two other analyses have found that unit 
9
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cost continues to fall, bringing scale benefits, when annual volume exceeds the 
experience on Target. 
 
An empirical study of payment costs on 21 public and private large value payment 
networks across 20 countries for 2001 found that the unit cost per transaction averaged 
$1.30 and ranged between $.29 to $3.91(Khiaonarong, 2003).  This also tended to vary 
by region, as shown in Table 1.
5 
 
Table 1: Average Unit Cost Per Transaction on 21 Large Value Payment Networks 




Number of Networks  Average Unit Cost 
European Union  10  $1.54 
East Asia-Pacific  9    1.15 
North America  2    0.84 
    
Total 21  $1.30 
  Source: Adapted from Khiaonarong (2003) Table 6, page 29. 
 
Regressing unit or average cost (AC) on transaction volume (Vol) for these 21 large 
value networks gave the following results: 
 
(1)  ln AC = 3.83 - 0.58 ln Vol 
 
where both parameters were significantly different from zero at the 99% level of 
confidence.  Other variables added to this simple regression gave significant scale effect 
parameters ranging between -0.49 to -0.67.  Focusing on the result in (1), this says that 
if transaction volume on a large value payment network were to double then average 
cost per transaction on average falls by 58%.
6  Taking the average cost per transaction 
of $1.30 across the 21 networks, a doubling of transaction volume suggests that average 
cost could fall by perhaps $0.75 to a level of around $0.55 if no prices rose during this 
period (i.e., if inflation was zero).
 7 At present only the very largest Target processing 
sites seem to incur a unit cost of around $1.30 per transaction (others are higher).  If 
transaction growth was 10% a year, as it was on Target over 1999-2002, it would take 
about 7.5 years to double transaction volume.
8 Equation (1) tells us the percent change 
                                                 
5 Unit costs in local currency values were translated into U.S. dollars at market exchange rates.  
Had purchasing power rates been used these average values would be somewhat higher. In the 
range of unit costs shown in the text, one (clearly non-comparable) network in Khiaonarong 
(2003) was ignored. 
6 In a cross-section study such as this, the common maintained hypothesis is that a payment 
network with relatively low volume and relatively high unit cost would "look like" the average of 
payment networks with higher volumes and lower unit costs if its volume were to expand. 
7 Since (1) can be re-expressed as ln TC = 3.83 + .42 ln Vol, the cross-section relationship for 21 
large value payment networks in 2001 yields a scale economy value of .42. The re-expression 
relies on the fact that ln AC = lnTC - ln Vol. 
8 Greater accuracy in estimating scale effects would be obtained if (1) had been specified as a 
log quadratic with (ln Vol)
2 as an additional explanatory variable to capture better how scale 
benefits tend to be reduced as larger and larger volumes are attained. As the data used in 
Khiaonarong (2003) are confidential, this could not be done. 
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in average cost as volume expands across the different networks, networks with a wider 
range of annual transaction volumes than currently exists on Target. 
 
A more comprehensive analysis of large value payment network scale effects concerns 
an effort to estimate the relative importance of three major determinants of the reduction 
in unit cost on Fedwire over 1979 to 1996 (Hancock, Humphrey, and Wilcox, 1999).
9 
Between 1979 and 1996, Fedwire average cost per transaction fell by about 24% in 
nominal terms (but 62% in real terms). 
 
The three major determinants of the reduction in Fedwire costs were: processing center 
consolidation, scale economies from expanded volume, and technological change which 
lowered processing and telecommunication costs directly.  Data processing and 
telecommunication costs accounted for upwards of 86% of Fedwire expenses (the 
remaining costs were distributed among labor, building, and materials inputs).  Data 
processing input prices (which reflected on-going technical improvements) fell by 51% 
over 1979-1996.  Telecommunication input prices (which also reflected technical change 
and deregulation) rose by 38% over the same period while the prices of labor, buildings, 
and materials rose by 100% to 246%.  The reduction in the price of data processing 
inputs relative to telecommunication inputs was associated with a rise in the quantity of 
data processing inputs relative to those for telecommunication, indicating that these two 
inputs are strong substitutes for one another.
10 
 
Simply put, large value payments can be processed in a distributed manner where there 
are many processing sites and relatively little use is made of telecommunications or 
processing can be centralized and greater use is made of telecommunications.  The 
change in relative prices over 1979-1996 clearly favored centralized over distributed 
processing.  Responding to price incentives, and reflecting a need to control Fedwire 
costs due to legislation that required the Federal Reserve to fully price its payment 
services, the 12 separate Fedwire processing sites in 1979 were consolidated into a 
single site in 1996. The cost reduction from consolidating processing operations was 
only partially offset by incurring greater telecommunication costs.  In 1979, 36 customer 
service offices which handled wire transfer requests had telecommunication links with 12 
processing sites.  By 1996, there were 12 customer service offices (one in each Federal 
Reserve District) that communicated with a single processing center. 
 
The overall cost effect of consolidation, normal volume growth, and technical change on 
Fedwire unit cost is illustrated in Figure 1.  The jagged line shows how actual Fedwire 
average cost per transaction (noted on the Y-axis) varied over 75 quarterly observations 
during 1979-1997 (numbered 1 to 75 on the X-axis).  Over this period, annual Fedwire 
volume expanded from 35 to 83 million.  The straight line is from a simple linear 
regression of average cost against time while the smooth curved line is a cubic spline 
fitted to the same data. 
 
                                                 
9 Unit payment costs combine processing costs and telecommunication expenses.  Processing 
costs are composed of labor, building, and computer expenses to electronically transfer funds 
from one party to another while telecommunication and other associated expenses are incurred in 
sending and receiving payment messages from the funds transfer initiating and receiving parties. 
10 Quantities were derived by dividing nominal expenditures by the relevant technology or quality 
adjusted price indices. 
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Average costs on Fedwire fell from about $0.48 per transaction in 1979 to around $0.35 
in 1996, a reduction of 26% in nominal terms.  This cost reduction in nominal terms 
occurred even as the U.S. GDP deflator rose by 81% over this period and the cost-of-
living index expanded by 116%. Thus it is clear that strong scale economies exist for 
large value payment networks and that Target, Euro1, and other networks could expect 
to experience roughly similar scale effects with increases in their transaction volume 
over time. 
 
Annual transaction volume on Target is around 65 million and its largest single 
processing site handled about 22 million transactions in 2000.  This single site figure is 
considerably less than the single site volume of 115 million annual transactions on 
Fedwire or the 64 million on CHIPS.  To obtain the benefits from scale economies, 
Target essentially has two choices: it can realize these economies over time consistent 
with its historical rate of volume growth of 10% a year or it can choose to consolidate its 
processing operations by folding some or most of its smaller volume sites into one of the 
currently larger sites.  In the latter case, greater scale economies will be realized more 
rapidly.  Alternatively, Target could adopt standardized and more efficient processing 
technology at each of its existing sites and this too could markedly reduce unit costs 
(Leinonen, 2002).  However, also other considerations--such as operational ease and 
security--need to be considered along with unit cost.
11  Of course, neither arrangement 
would disrupt the legal account relationship between banks and their individual central 
bank for settlement purposes. 
 
The average cost per transaction on Target in 2000 was around 1.80 euro while the 
average cost at the two central banks with the greatest volume averaged around 1.15 
euros (European Central Bank, 2001).
12  Although these figures are only approximate 
and preliminary, they contrast sharply with the current $0.34 cost per transaction on 
Fedwire and CHIPS which have centralized their processing operations.
13  CHIPS 
processes about three times the volume as the largest volume site on Target (64 million 
transactions compared to 22 million on Target) while Fedwire, which incurs greater 
telecommunication costs than does CHIPS, processes over five times as much (115 
million compared to 22 million).
14  Since annual volume on Target is around 65 million, 
                                                 
11 While the experience of Fedwire and CHIPS indicate that strong scale economies exist within a 
centralized processing framework, we have no similar experience to draw upon to assess the 
likely unit costs associated with implementing new and lower cost technology--along with related 
telecommunication and other expenses--within a distributed processing framework.  Such a 
detailed and comparative study would be necessary before the ECB (and member central banks) 
could appropriately decide on the most cost effective configuration for Target. 
12 At early 2004 exchange rates, 1.15 euros translates into around $1.30, which was the average 
cost over 21 networks shown in Table 1. 
13 CHIPS and Fedwire incur about the same unit costs ($0.34 per transaction) and both split this 
cost equally between the paying and receiving banks.  Thus fees are about $0.17 for each party 
(Mohr, 2003).  CHIPS is jointly owned by its commercial bank users and is operated as a 
"payment utility" that recovers all of its costs and funds transfers over Fedwire and CHIPS are in 
practice strong substitutes for one another.  While this suggests that the type of ownership of a 
large value network per se has little effect on user choice, it does support the view that 
competition can be important for achieving low costs per transaction. 
14 The low unit cost experienced on CHIPS is made possible by having a centralized processing 
facility with strong scale economies plus low telecommunication expenses (since all CHIPS 
transactions are made by entities located in New York City, rather than geographically distributed 
across the country as they are on Fedwire). 
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consolidating processing on Target would close to triple the volume that now exists at 
the largest processing site and yield considerably greater scale benefits than relying on 
the normal rate of volume growth of about 10% a year. By lowering overall unit costs and 
transaction prices, consolidation of processing centers on Target would enhance 
allocative and productive efficiency. 
 
3.2 Target and the public benefits of a natural monopoly   
 
Given the strong scale economies that appear to exist on large value networks, an 
argument can be made that Target be considered a natural monopoly.  To provide an 
incentive for potential users to expand transaction volume on Target and realize its full 
potential for scale economies, Target need not be required--at least initially--to cover all 
or most of its current costs.  Instead, prices could be set to equal the lower unit cost 
expected to be incurred once most of its scale benefits (or benefits from improved 
processing technology--c.f., Leinonen, 2002) have been achieved.  The social trade-off 
would then basically be a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. In particular, 
between: 
  (1) The cost of a transition period which equals the discounted value of the 
expenses not recovered while Target expands its transaction volume at a consolidated 
processing site up to the limit established by the size of a market; and 
  (2) The benefits of a mature system which equals the discounted value of the 
future cost savings from lowering expenses from their current level. 
 
This comparison puts a premium on keeping the transition period as short as possible 
and illustrates the importance of determining when transaction volume growth has 
reached the limit associated with the size of the market.  It is at this point that the 
justification for subsidizing unit cost only to achieve unrealized scale economies no 
longer applies or is very weak in economic terms.
15 
 
At the present time, Target does not fully charge for the payment services it provides to 
the banking industry.  Thus continuing this arrangement on Target, or only charging a 
low future expected price equivalent to unit cost once scale economies have been fully 
realized in the market (or new technology is in place), would be unlikely to result in any 
extra growth in payment volume over the "normal" growth it already experiences.  Target 
has, in its present configuration of some 16 separate processing sites, already effectively 
reached the limit of the size of its market and future scale benefits will depend on the 
normal expansion of this market over time.  Put differently, if Target were to continue 
with its current configuration of distributed processing and existing nonstandard 
technology, a scale economy argument for subsidizing unit cost does not apply as the 
scale benefits associated with the size of the market have already been realized 
(although unit costs are higher than they would otherwise be with distributed processing 
and standardized technology).
16 
                                                 
15 However, Target could continue to be subsidized if the provision of its payment services were 
determined to have strong public benefits in terms of ensuring financial market stability. This, 
effectively, has been the judgement the Bank of Japan made for its large value payment network. 
This consideration is developed more fully in Angelini and Maresca (2004) and Pagès and 
Humphrey (2004). 
16 Put in terms of the infant industry argument often used to justify tariffs or quotas adopted to 
protect a domestic industry until a scale of operation and lower costs are achieved to allow it to 
compete with foreign imports, Target--in its current configuration--would not be considered to be 
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As Target has already reached the limit of its market share under its current 
configuration, a justification for continued subsidization on scale economy grounds alone 
can only reasonably be made if: 
  (a) The scale benefit of having only one supplier for all large value payments is 
so strong that the provision of large value payments is deemed to be a regulated 
monopoly (similar to arguments that have in the past supported regulated monopolies for 
electricity and telephone services); or  
  (b) Target decides to consolidate its processing sites into one or a few centers to 
realize greater scale benefits (and lower costs).  At least initially, these consolidated 
sites would not yet have realized the limit imposed by the size of the market since 
volume growth there would exceed normal, historical rates during a transition period. 
 
There is no international agreement on the issue in (a).  In the U.S., with two suppliers of 
large value payments (CHIPS and Fedwire), the regulated monopoly argument has been 
rejected in favor of competition versus greater scale benefits.  In Japan this argument 
has been accepted and implemented with the full subsidization of their single large value 
network.  Thus (a) is a judgement call on the part of policy makers who could point to 
arguments on both sides of this issue--but not rely on scale economies alone to make 
the case one way or another. 
 
The situation in (b) could be used to justify full or partial subsidization on Target for a 
limited time period.  Policy makers could decide to consolidate processing sites to 
achieve more rapidly scale economies compared to what the normal expansion of the 
payments market would bring.  Here subsidization could be justified using the above 
criteria that compares the discounted cost of a subsidized transition period with the 
discounted cost savings obtained when a mature, consolidated system is achieved or 




IV. Cost recovery and pricing on Target 
 
4.1 Pricing policy and cost recovery with scale economies 
 
Marginal cost pricing--where the extra benefit to the user of a payment service is 
equated with the extra cost to the supplier--achieves allocative efficiency and avoids 
cross-subsidization.
17 Despite its theoretic soundness, marginal cost pricing is often 
difficult to implement since marginal costs are hard to accurately measure and, as well, 
will not fully recover costs when scale economies exist. While average cost pricing 
implemented with a single fee can recover all costs, it would likely discourage users to 
utilize fully the scale benefits that are available. 
 
A reasonable departure from marginal cost pricing is 'two-part pricing' consisting of a 
fixed price to recover the average fixed cost of producing payment services (reflecting 
processing economies of scale) and a variable price or transaction-based fee to recover 
                                                                                                                                                 
an "infant industry" since it has already "grown up" and achieved the limit of scale benefits 
associated with the current size of the market under its current configuration. 
17 However, in two-sided markets the ‘user’s pay principle’ ceases to hold for the individual 
market sides, rather one should compare total price with joint marginal costs (Wright, 2003).  
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average variable costs. Here the benefits of high volume operations are passed on to 
those high volume users that generate the economies of scale and the average price of 
the payment service decreases with the number of units demanded. Two-part tariffs 
correspond to a quantity discount and also assures that the degree of cross-
subsidization between different end-users is limited. A two-part pricing approach would 
resolve most of the scale problems and is indeed a standard pricing approach where 
fixed costs are large but where all costs may need to be recovered.
18 
 
4.2 Pricing policy and cost recovery with scope economies 
 
Target currently provides both government-related services and payment services to 
private banks or financial institutions.  Government-related services involve: (1) the 
maintenance of reserve accounts with the banking system for final settlement of net 
positions of retail or large value payment transactions made on other payment networks; 
(2) monetary control payment transactions in financial markets; and (3) other 
government payment functions.  Bank-related services involve the processing of large 
value RTGS payment transactions.  These two services are jointly produced as they 
likely share some of the costs of maintaining accounts, computer processing of 
payments, and telecommunication facilities between banks and the central bank. This 
suggests the existence of scope economies on Target.  Here the sum of the cost of a 
stand-alone payment network providing only central bank and government-related 
payment services plus the cost of a second stand-alone network that only provides 
payment services to the banking industry would likely be more expensive than a single 
network that provides both services jointly. 
 
When scope economies exist, the allocation of joint production costs need not rely on a 
simple accounting rule-of-thumb to distribute the joint cost of the two main service 
categories on Target.  Indeed, the cost that is allocated to the provision of payment 
services for the banking industry can be the additional cost incurred for processing, 
telecommunication, and site operations after the stand-alone cost associated with 
providing government-related services is determined.  All costs would be recovered as 
the government would cover the costs it incurs (the stand-alone government service 
cost) and the banking sector would cover the cost it incurs (the additional cost).
19 
 
The relative importance of the stand-alone costs of providing only government-related 
payment services on Target is roughly indicated by how large the share of government-
related payment volume is.  This share averages less than 1% across 16 Target 
processing sites with even lower values at sites with the largest total volumes.  Even if 
the 1% government volume is associated with 10 times its share of processing 
equipment, telecommunication connections, labor input, and site facility cost--so that 
10% of the cost on Target could be allocated to stand-alone government costs, this 
would still leave 90% of total costs to be recovered from private sector users. In sum, the 
scope economy argument for cost allocation could be applied but its impact is likely to 
be relatively small. 
 
                                                 
18 Holthausen and Rochet (2002) consider efficient two-part pricing of large-value payments in the 
presence of unobservable heterogeneity about banks' future payment volumes. 
19 This approach would need to be refined with the assistance of technical experts who have a 
detailed knowledge of the internal cost structure and operations of Target. 
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We know of no study that has attempted to determine the possible scope economies 
among the various payment services offered on a large value network.  However, there 
have been a few empirical studies that have attempted to determine scope economies 
among a broader range of payment and banking services.  Importantly, when a proper 
functional form is used, these investigations have found little support for the existence of 
significant scope economies either within the commercial banking industry or between 
different payment services provided by the Federal Reserve.
20  This suggests that, aside 
from general managerial overhead and some likely sharing of infrastructure costs, scope 
effects are more likely to be small than very large for the central banks that comprise 
Target.  A more definitive answer here will have to wait until the requisite cost 





This paper discusses various theoretic concepts which contribute to assessing the public 
benefits of Target. These concepts touch upon natural monopoly, network externalities, 
competition, as well as two-sided markets and economies of scale and scope. The 
results of an earlier econometric analysis of the effects on unit cost from standardization 
and consolidation of the Federal Reserve's large value payment network (Fedwire) 
largely comprise the empirical part of this paper.  Based on this analysis, it is argued that 
if Target decided to standardize its operating platforms and consolidate its processing 
sites into one or a few centers, it too could realize strong scale economy benefits and 
lower unit costs. 
 
The concept of a natural monopoly provides a rationale for a temporary partial or full 
subsidy in order for Target to achieve the ‘most efficient scale’ and lower unit costs.  
Such a subsidy can be  implemented through temporary 'penetration' pricing (i.e., pricing 
at less than full current cost).  When the potential scale benefits are fully realized, given 
the size of the market, the subsidy would be removed and full cost pricing implemented.  
After unit costs have been lowered and reflected in the prices charged, users would face 
the full costs of their payment decisions.  This would permit them to better match 
benefits with actual costs resulting in a more proper and efficient allocation of resources 
than occurs today on Target. 
 
Possible scope economies on Target between central bank monetary control 
responsibilities and providing payment services for the private sector could not be 
determined due to a lack of the necessary cost accounting data for these two broad 
categories of Target services.  Information that does exist, however, suggests that scope 
benefits may be small, as they have been found to be in empirical studies of scope 
economies among payment services operated by the Federal Reserve.  
                                                 
20 Little to no scope effects were found between Federal Reserve ACH and wire transfer 
operations (Adams, Bauer, and Sickles, 2002) and only weak scope effects were identified 
between U.S. commercial bank deposits and loans (Pulley and Humphrey, 1993) where most had 
expected to see a strong relationship. 
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